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On the basis of the properties of the Jordan matrix, we proposed a secret sharing scheme
which can realize both the (t, n) threshold and the adversary structure and share a
large secret while each participant has a short share. At the same time, the scheme can
prevent the participants from cheating. The shares can be kept secret in the process
of reconstruction and do not need to be renewed when the shared secret is changed.
If n participants want to share a large secret using a short share such that t or more
participants can reconstruct the shared secret and there are some subsets that each contain
at least t participants that cannot reconstruct the shared secret, our scheme will be
effective.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Secret sharing plays an important role in information security and cryptography. It has wide applications in such fields
as key escrow, electronic commerce, secure multiparty computation, control of missile launches, and so on. A secret sharing
scheme was first introduced independently in [1,2] in 1979. In this scheme, the secret was divided into n shares; any t or
more participants can recover the secret using their respective share, but any t − 1 or fewer cannot—this is called the (t, n)
threshold scheme. [3–5] proposed some secret sharing schemes realizing general access structure. [6,7] proposed some
secret sharing schemes for general adversary structure. [8] gave a secret sharing scheme satisfying both the (t, n) threshold
and the adversary structure, that is, t or more participants can reconstruct the shared secret, and there are some subsets
that each contain at least t participants that cannot reconstruct the shared secret. In [8], each participant has to save a share
of size m|S| (m is the number of adversary sets) at most when the length of the secret is |S|. Obviously, this is inefficient
when the secret is a big privacy file, a big message transmitted on an insecure channel or enormous data in distributed
storage. In order to make up for this deficiency, on the basis of the research of Liu et al. [9], which presented a method
for reducing the size of the participant’s share, we proposed a new scheme which satisfies both the (t, n) threshold and
the adversary structure and where each participant only needs to save a short share of size |S|+|a|t + (|S|+|a|)(m−1)t2 at most.
Besides this, the scheme can prevent the participants from cheating. The participants do not provide their real shares and
the shares do not need to be renewed when the secret is changed. Therefore, our scheme is effective and has wide scope of
application.
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2. Definitions
2.1. The Jordan matrix
Let A be an n × nmatrix over the field of real numbers, denoted as A ∈ Rn×n. In general, A is similar to a block diagonal
matrix
J =
J1(λ1) . . .
Jr(λr)

where each block Ji(λi) is a square matrix of the form
Ji(λi) =

λi 1
λi
. . .
. . . 1
λi
 .
So there exists an invertible matrix P such that P−1AP = J . J and P are called the Jordan normal form and the similitude
transformation matrix of A, respectively. Each Ji(λi) is called a Jordan block of A. Obviously, for a given Jordan normal form
J and similitude transformation matrix P of A, A is uniquely determined.
Theorem 2.1. Assume that A ∈ Rn×n, and J is the given Jordan normal form of A. If J is known, the probability for getting A is
equal to that of guessing P.
Proof. Let the elements on the diagonal of J be λ1, . . . , λn; then
P−1AP = J → AP = PJ → A(p1, . . . , pn) = (p1, . . . , pn)J
→

Ap1 = λ1p1
Apj = tjpj−1 + λjpj 2 ≤ j ≤ n
where tj is the element directly over λj in J; tj = 0 or 1.
When λj is known and A is unknown, even if tj = 0, we cannot get any information about pj. Therefore, if J is known, the
probability for getting A is equal to that of guessing P .
More properties of the Jordan matrix can be found in [10]. 
2.2. The access structure and the adversary structure
Let P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} be the set of participants. An access structure, denoted by Γ , is a collection of subsets of P
satisfying the monotone ascending property: for any A′ ⊆ Γ and A ⊆ 2P , A ⊇ A′ implies A ∈ Γ . An adversary structure,
named as A, is a collection of subsets of P satisfying the monotone descending property: for any A′ ⊆ A and A ⊆ 2P , A ⊆ A′
implies A ∈ A. Because of the monotone properties, for any access structure Γ and any adversary structure A, it is enough
to consider the minimum access structure:
Γmin = {A ∈ Γ | ∀B ⊂ A ⇒ B ∉ Γ }
and the maximum adversary structure:
Amax = {B ∈ A|∀A ⊇ B ⇒ A ∉ A}.
2.3. A valid secret sharing scheme
A secret sharing scheme is a valid scheme if it has both the reconstruction property and the confidentiality property.
Reconstruction property [8]: if a secret sharing scheme can guarantee that any qualified subset of the participants can
reconstruct the shared secret, then the scheme has the reconstruction property.
Confidentiality property [8]: if a secret sharing scheme can guarantee that any unqualified subset of the participants
cannot reconstruct the shared secret, then the scheme has the confidentiality property.
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3. The scheme
3.1. The initialization phase
In this section, we will construct a secret sharing scheme which satisfies both the (t, n) threshold and the adversary
structure and shares a large secret while each participant has a short share. That is, t or more participants can use their
short shares to reconstruct the secret, however, there are some subsets that each contain at least t participants that cannot
reconstruct the shared secret. Let P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} denote the set of n participants who want to share a large secret S.
Amax is the maximum adversary structure on P . A1, A2, . . . , Am are m subsets contained in Amax and each of them contains
t participants at least. The secret sharing scheme can be described as follows:
(1) If |X | ≥ t and X ⊈ Ai (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m), then the participants in X can reconstruct the shared secret S.
(2) If |X | < t or X ⊆ Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m), then the participants in X cannot reconstruct S.
(3) Each participant only needs to save a short share when sharing a large secret among them.
3.2. The distribution phase
Let D denote the trustworthy dealer who wants to share a secret S among the participants.
(1) D divides S into t2 pieces such that S = s1 ∥ s2 ∥ · · · ∥ st2 , where ‘‘∥’’ denotes concatenation. We can populate data to
the end of S such that |s1| = |s2| = · · · = |st2 |. Then D constructs a matrix
A =

s1 s2 · · · st
st+1 st+2 · · · s2t
...
...
...
st(t−1)+1 st(t−1)+2 · · · st2
 .
(2) D computes the Jordan normal form J and the similitude transformation matrix P of A. J and P are formed as follows:
J =
J1(λ1) . . .
Js(λs)
 ,
where
Ji(λi) =

λi 1
λi
. . .
. . . 1
λi

ri×ri
and P = (p1, p2, . . . , pt), where pi is a t-dimensional column vector. Obviously, |pi| = |S|+|a|t , (i = 1, 2, . . . , t), where|a| is the length of the populated data.
(3) Let
β =

λ1 r1
λ2 r2
...
...
λs rs
 ;
then β can uniquely denote J .
(4) Choose two large prime numbers p and q satisfying |pq| > |S|+|a|
t2
, where |pq| is the length of pq. Let N = pq. Choose an
integer g from the interval [N1/2,N] to make g ≠ p or q.
(5) Selectm different positive integers such that 1 ≤ d1 + d2 + · · · + dm ≤ N . Let d0 = d1 + d2 + · · · + dm and generate
n arrays that are the same, Hi = {d1, d2, . . . , dm}, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(6) D chooses n different t-dimensional column vectors ki (i = 1, 2, . . . , n); each component of ki belongs to the
interval [2,N]. Distribute ki to participant Pi through a secret channel as the secret share of that participant. Compute
Ri = gkimodN for each ki.
(7) D selects an integer k0 from interval [2,N] such that k0 is relatively prime to (p − 1) and (q − 1); then compute
R0 = gk0modN . Generate an integer h such that k0 × h = 1modϕ(N), where ϕ(N) is Euler’s totient function. Then
compute ki′ = R0kimodN for each ki (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
(8) D computes d = R0d0modN and P ′ = d−1PmodN , with the notation P ′ = (p′1, p′2, . . . , p′t).
(9) D constructs a (t−1)-degree polynomial f (x) = p′1+p′2x+· · ·+p′txt−1, and computes f (k′i) for each k′i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
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(10) D computes Ei = gdimodN for each di (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m). If Pi ∈ Aj,D deletes dj from Hi, for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Then D
sends the remaining elements in Hi to Pi.
(11) D publishes β,N, h, R0, Ri (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), f (k′i) (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), Ei (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m).
3.3. The reconstruction phase
Let X = {Pj1, Pj2, . . . , Pjw} ⊆ P(w ≥ t) and X ⊈ Ai (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m); then the participants in X can reconstruct the
shared secret S. The process of reconstruction can be described as follows:
(1) Because N and R0 are public, Pji can use his or her share kji to compute the k′ji = R0kjimodN . Then Pji sends k′ji to
D, i = 1, 2, . . . , w.
(2) According to the k′ji and the public information f (k
′
ji) (i = 1, 2, . . . , w),D can reconstruct the (t−1)-degree polynomial
f (x) through Lagrange interpolation becausew ≥ t , and then gets p′1, p′2, . . . , p′t , which are all the column vectors of P ′.
(3) Assume that D sent Hji = {d1, d2, . . . , dk} to Pji in the distribution phase; then Pji computes d′v = R0dv (v = 1, . . . , k)
and sends d′v to D for v = 1, 2, . . . , k.
(4) D deletes the redundant d′i which are the same, and only keeps one for each different d
′
i . Then D computes d
′
1 × d′2 ×
· · · × d′mmodN = R0d1+d2++dmmodN = R0d0modN = d, and gets d.
(5) D gets P through computing P = dP ′.
(6) D gets J from the public β , then computes A from A = PJP−1. On the basis of the method of construction of A,D can get
the secret S easily.
4. Analysis of the scheme
4.1. Validity
(1) The reconstruction property.
If |X | ≥ t and X ⊈ Ai (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m), then the participants in X can reconstruct the shared secret S.
Proof. Because |X | ≥ t,D can use k′i offered by the participants in X and the public f (k′i) to reconstruct the (t − 1)-degree
polynomial f (x) through Lagrange interpolation, and get P ′. At the same time, because X ⊈ Ai (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m), the
participants in X can reconstruct d. Thus, D can compute P = dP ′ and A = PJP−1, and get the shared secret S easily. 
(2) The confidentiality property.
If |X | < t or X ⊆ Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m), then the participants in X cannot reconstruct S.
Proof. If |X | < t,D cannot get enough k′i to construct the (t − 1)-degree polynomial f (x). Thus D cannot get P ′ and S. If
X ⊆ Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m), then all the participants in X do not have the share di, so they cannot compute d′i . Therefore, D cannot
get d and S. 
4.2. The anti-cheating property
In the reconstruction phase, the participants do not provide their real shares ki and di, but k′i and d
′
i . D can verify k
′
i and d
′
i
through the public Ri, Ei and h. If (k′i)h = RimodN , then k′i is true; otherwise, k′i is false. Similarly, if (d′i)h = EimodN , then d′i
is true; otherwise, d′i is false.
4.3. The performance
Ref. [8] proposed a secret sharing scheme which meets the requirements of both the (t, n) threshold and the adversary
structure. It is inefficient when sharing a large secret S, because each participant has to save a share of sizem|S| at most. For
making up this deficiency, we proposed the above scheme according to the properties of the Jordan matrix. Our scheme not
only has all the advantages of the scheme in [8], but also can share a large secret when each participant has a short share.
(1) S is the large secret of size |S|. In order to share S among n participants, each participant only needs to save a short share
of size |S|+|a|t + (|S|+|a|)(m−1)t2 at most (m is the number of adversary sets) because |ki| = |S|+|a|t , |di| = |S|+|a|t2 . Obviously,
our scheme is more efficient than the scheme proposed in [8] and can be widely applied.
(2) In our scheme, t or more participants can reconstruct the shared secret S; but there are m subsets that each contain at
least t participants that cannot reconstruct the shared secret. That is, our scheme realizes both the (t, n) threshold and
the adversary structure.
(3) The shares can be used repeatedly because that the participants do not need to provide their real shares. And the shares
are safe since their security is equal to the difficulty of large integer factorization.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper,we provided a new schemewhich satisfies both the (t, n) threshold and the adversary structure and shares a
large secret while each participant has a short share. At the same time, every participant can test whether other participants
provided the true share or not. The shares can be kept secret in the process of reconstruction and do not need to be renewed
when the shared secret is changed. It is effective and has wide scope of application.
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